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Abstract
Poverty measures in developing countries often ignore the distribution of resources
within families and the gains from joint consumption. In this paper, we extend the col-
lective model of household consumption to recover mother￿ s, father￿ s and children￿ s shares
together with economies of scale, using the observation of adult-speci￿c goods and an ex-
tended version of the Rothbarth method. The application on data from C￿te d￿ Ivoire shows
that children command a reasonable fraction of household resources, though not enough to
avoid a very large extent of child poverty compared to what is found in traditional measures
based on per capita expenditure. We ￿nd no signi￿cant evidence of discrimination against
girls, and educated mothers have more command over household resources. Baseline re-
sults on children￿ s shares are robust to using alternative identifying assumptions, which
consolidates a general approach grounded on a ￿ exible version of the Rothbarth method.
Individual measures of poverty show that parents are highly compensated by the scale
economies due to joint consumption.
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The ultimate object of concern of redistributive policies is the welfare of individuals while the
literature has mainly focused on measuring inequality and poverty among households. In par-
ticular, attempts to assess how much of the family resources are dedicated to children, and to
evaluate child poverty in this way, are relatively rare. Two well-known problems pertain to the
fact that (i) individual allocations within households are rarely observed, and that (ii) welfare
measures rarely account for joint consumption in the household. In some occasions, researchers
have used anthropometric information (e.g., caloric in-take) to proxy individual nutrition in
very low-income countries. This type of research has revealed a very substantial level of intra-
household inequality (e.g., Haddad and Kanbur, 1990). In more general cases, economists must
rely on indirect methods to retrieve the share of household resources commanded by speci￿c
individuals and in particular by children. Among the di⁄erent techniques available, the Roth-
barth method (Rothbarth, 1943) is possibly the most theoretically sound approach. As clearly
exposed in Gronau (1988, 1991), it consists in examining the extent to which the presence of
children depresses the household consumption of adult-speci￿c goods. The method has been
used in the context of developing countries to measure the cost of children and the extent of
gender discrimination among children (see Deaton, 1989, 1997).1 A notable drawback of this
approach, however, is that it assumes purely private consumption. Obviously, the consumption
of some goods is partly joint ￿or fully joint, in the case of household public goods like housing
￿and generates economies of scale in multi-person households. This is a central concern in the
construction of equivalence scales and the measurement of welfare. In addition, the Rothbarth-
Gronau model is not grounded in a microeconomic framework that respects individualism and
accounts for the possibly diverging opinions of the parents.
Against this background, the present paper suggests a measure of resource allocation in a multi-
person model with economies of scale and parental bargaining. Using data from C￿te d￿ Ivoire,
we particularly focus on the share of total expenditure accruing to children and on an original
measure of child poverty based on individual resources. The sharing rule and scale economies
are identi￿ed using an extended version of the Gronau-Rothbarth approach within a structural
collective model, i.e., a model that only assumes the e¢ ciency of consumption decisions within
the household (Chiappori, 1988).
The approach explicitly deals with the fact that datasets typically contain total purchases at
1See Gronau (1989, 1991) and Lazear and Michael (1988) on the Rothbarth approach. See Browning (1992)
for a survey of the various techniques used to measure the cost of children. Note that with this method, the
direct utility or disutility from living with others (such as love and companionship) is necessarily assumed to be
separable from consumption goods and ignored.
1household levels but not the allocation of goods between household members, even when con-
sumption is purely private (as in the case of ￿ personal goods and services￿ , for instance). Iden-
ti￿cation relies on the existence of adult goods in the data (adult clothing) and on a simple
logic that extends the initial Rothbarth idea. As suggested by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), an
￿ independence of base￿assumption allows us to simplify the approach, i.e., economies of scale
have a pure income e⁄ect and the empirical application is reduced to the estimation of a system
of Engel curves on cross-sectional data. The outcome of parents￿bargaining process is recovered
by the use of data on single individuals (the demographic group of reference).
Once the resource shares of adults and children have been estimated, they can be used to compute
a direct measure of individual poverty whereby poor persons are not characterized by living in
poor households, according to conventional de￿nitions, but are poor because the resources they
receive in the household are below some poverty line. In the empirical application, we focus on
C￿te d￿ Ivoire, which is the second largest economy in West Africa and a country where almost
half the population is poor, i.e., lives on less than $2 per day. We also choose this country
because it has received much attention in the literature on intrahousehold inequality, so that we
can compare traditional results with our novel approach. Due to the quality of the data available
and because of some evidence of unequal distribution within households, this country has indeed
been the subject of studies by Deaton (1989), Haddad and Hoddinott (1994), Haddad et al.
(1994) and many other articles referenced in Deaton (1997).
Our results point to reasonable magnitudes for children￿ s share, from around 13% of total house-
hold expenditure for the ￿rst child to a ￿fth for three children. Shares increase with family size
at a decreasing pace, denoting potential economies of scale in child consumption but also the
fact that parents are not ready, beyond a certain point, to reduce their own consumption much.
Boys receive more than girls but di⁄erences are not signi￿cant. That is, there is no clear sign
of gender discrimination among children as far as expenditure unrelated to health or education
are concerned, as also found by Deaton (1989) for the same country or Bhalotra and Att￿eld
(1998) for food allocation among children in Pakistan.2 Women seem to command a smaller,
yet not signi￿cantly di⁄erent, share of resources compared to their husbands. It turns out that
mothers￿education improves their own share and their children￿ s share. We ￿nd evidence of
substantial economies of scale, especially for mothers.3 Using resource share estimates, we ￿nd a
much larger incidence of poverty among children, and lower among adults, compared to measures
simply based on per capita expenditures. Originally, we also provide poverty measures adjusted
2Evidence of gender discrimination is found in Rose (1999) for India and Dunbar et al. (2010) for Malawi.
The literature on discrimination in health and education expenditures is vast and beyond the scope of our study.
3These terms are not precisely estimated, however, and may, as explained in the paper, capture other dimen-
sions like changes in individual preferences across di⁄erent household types.
2for scale economies. We ￿nd that adults in couples, apparently poorer than singles, are in fact
greatly compensated by the gains from joint consumption. Our results compare well to those of
Dunbar et al. (2010), whose estimates of children￿ s share for Malawi rely on a relatively similar
approach. We also provide two variants of our model that focus on children￿ s share and do not
make use of data on single individual. The ￿rst one ignores distribution among parents and the
second additionally ignores scale economies (i.e., the traditional Rothbarth approach). Results
tend to consolidate a general approach grounded on the Rothbarth￿ s idea.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and the identi￿cation
results. In Section 3, we present the functional form, the estimation method and the data. In
Section 4, we report and discuss the main results. Additional results and a comparison with the
literature are presented in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The collective model assumes the e¢ ciency of household decisions in a static environment, and
posits individual preferences for each household member. The early collective model literature
has essentially consisted in testing e¢ ciency (e.g., Browning and Chiappori, 1998).4 Several
authors have also shown how to identify the slope of the resource sharing function in couples,
using price variation, distribution factors (Bourguignon et al., 2009) or exclusive goods in a con-
text where all the consumption is private (e.g., Browning et al., 1994). Retrieving the complete
sharing rule has been achieved more recently and at the price of additional assumptions. In
particular, some authors have combined data on people living alone and in couples to retrieve
individual preferences and hence the sharing function (e.g., Couprie, 2007, Lise and Seitz, 2011,
Browning et al., 2008, Lewbel and Pendakur, 2008). They implicitly assume the stability of
individual preferences across household types, an assumption acknowledged by Gronau (1988)
as a necessary condition to retrieve the various structural components of the model and, in par-
ticular, the cost of children. Importantly, none of the contributions listed above explicitly model
child welfare or economies of scale.5
4Even this minimalist assumption, that could be justi￿ed by the repeated-game context of a family, is not
consensual. Tests of e¢ ciency have been rejected in the case of production choices in developing countries (for
C￿te d￿ Ivoire, see Du￿ o and Udry, 2004). More recent studies tend however to restore the e¢ ciency result (see
Rangel and Thomas, 2005, for West Africa). Assuming e¢ ciency is also more plausible in the case of ￿frequently
repeated ￿consumption decisions. Tests of e¢ ciency in consumption are usually not rejected in the literature
(see Chiappori and Donni, 2011, for a survey).
5The few papers dealing with children in a collective framework actually treat them as public goods for the
parents rather than as having their own utility functions (Blundell et al., 2005, Couprie, 2007). An exception
is the theoretical paper of Bourguignon (1999), but the author does not consider economies of scale in the
3More recently, Browning et al. (2008) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) have suggested the iden-
ti￿cation of multi-utility models with scale economies. In the former study, joint consumption is
modeled using (price) transformations ￿ la Barten. Lewbel and Pendakur simplify this approach
by assuming the ￿ independence of base￿(IB) assumption for the technology of production, i.e.,
they suppose that there exists a single function, independent of total expenditure, that scales
the expenditure of each individual in the household and represents the economies from joint
consumption. Both studies suggest completing identi￿cation of the model by exploiting simul-
taneously data on couples and single-person households. They recover the resource share of
each adult and indi⁄erence scales (an individual-based concept of equivalence scale, see Lew-
bel, 2003). These approaches cannot account for couples with children, as children do not live
alone. Nonetheless, these studies have inspired recent contributions which address the measure
of children￿ s shares in presence of economies of scale in a collective framework. The ￿rst one, by
Bargain and Donni (2009), focuses on one-child families in France and presents original identi-
￿cation results using information on singles and expenditures on adult goods, together with the
IB assumption. The second, by Dunbar et al. (2010), suggests a measure of children￿ s resources
in Malawi, using another identi￿cation method that requires expenditure on assignable goods
(adult male, adult female and child clothing) and semi-parametric restrictions close to the IB
condition.
The present paper is easily positioned in this literature. While several studies have estimated
systems of Engel curves to retrieve the cost of children or to test for gender discrimination among
children, for instance Deaton (1989), Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) or Haddad et al. (1994) for
C￿te d￿ Ivoire, we suggest integrating these measures into a more structural framework and allow
for more ￿ exibility than the original Rothbarth approach. We extend the identi￿cation results
of Bargain and Donni (2009) to households with several children and suggest one of the ￿rst
applications to the measurement of child shares and child poverty in a developing country.6 As
far as we know, the present paper is also the only attempt to incorporate scale economies and
to use indi⁄erence scales to reassess individual poverty among adults.
household nor any empirical implementation. Dauphin et al. (2011) suggest a test of collective rationality when
three deciders are present in the household, i.e., parents and one child, yet this concerns the speci￿c case of adult
children. A recent attempt to identify child costs can be found in Menon and Perali (2007).
6The other is the independent contribution of Dunbar et al. (2010), which we extensively compare with our
approach in Section 5. Both studies assume that the presence of children can be identi￿ed as an income e⁄ect
that decreases household budget shares on adult goods.
43 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Collective Decisions, Preferences and Consumption Technology
We examine household consumption decisions. To begin with, we suppose that there are three
types of households. Let n denote the type, with n = 1 for single adults, n = 2 for childless
couples and n = 3 for couples with children. Goods are indexed by superscript k = 1;:::K.
Individual types are indexed by subscript i and, by convention, we suppose that i = m indicates
men, i = w women and i = c children. The log total expenditure in a household is denoted by
x and the vector of log prices by p.
We ￿rst consider the case of a single-person household (n = 1). We simply suppose that individ-
ual i (= m or w) endowed with log resources x is characterized by a well-behaved (monotonic,
strictly quasi-convex, and three times continuously di⁄erentiable) indirect utility function, de-
noted by vi(x;p;zi), where zi is a vector of individual characteristics (such as age, education,








for i = m or w and k = 1;:::;K.
In the case of a multi-person households (n > 1), we ￿rst suppose that each person living in the
household has her/his own indirect utility function. For children, however, we only model the
utility of all children and c is an index for the representative child. The main idea is that, after
controlling for the existence of joint consumption and the sharing of total expenditure, the utility
function of each family member does not depend on the type n of the household. Precisely, the
indirect utility function of individual i = m;w or c living in a household of type n > 1 can be
written as vi(xi;n;p;zi), where xi;n is a measure of (log) individual resources taking into account
economies of scale and resource sharing as follows:
xi;n = x + log￿i;n(x;p;z) ￿ logsi;n(x;p;z):
In this expression, ￿i;n > 0 represents the share of total expenditure accruing to individual i
belonging to a household of type n and si;n > 0 the economies of scale that are associated to
this individual. This speci￿cation is explained in detail below.
Two important points must be made. First, the intuitive consequence of the speci￿cation above
is that, after conditioning on observed demographic variables and the level of total resources,
di⁄erences in expenditure patterns between a person living alone and a person living with others
are attributed to joint consumption and resource sharing. Assuming the stability of individual
5preferences across household types is the key idea underlying the Rothbarth traditional approach
to estimate child costs (see Gronau, 1988, 1991). In fact, this assumption is mitigated when the
model accounts for additional ￿ exibility in the form of scale economies, as discussed in Browning
et al. (2008) and Bargain and Donni (2009). Indeed, terms accounting for how the "value" of
total expenditure (or the shadow prices of all goods) changes due to publicness and externalities
in consumption may well also capture changes in preferences over time and family status. These
aspects are further discussed hereafter. Second, as mentioned above, the children living in the
household are characterized by a unique indirect utility function, i.e., the children￿ s preferences
are aggregated into a unique index. This way of proceeding is made for the sake of simplicity
but does not change the theoretical results. Also, it does not mean that we impose equal sharing
among children: the total share ￿c;3(x;p;z) of children may possibly depend on characteristics
z that include the number of boys versus girls, or the age of children, in order to check for
potential discrimination.7
Sharing Functions ￿i;n(x;p;z). As often used in the collective model literature (e.g., Brown-
ing et al., 1994), we adopt a two-stage budget process that conveniently represents any e¢ cient
decision-making. This representation is in fact perfectly suited to our main purpose of retriev-
ing children￿ s resource shares and goes as follows. In a ￿rst stage, household resources exp(x)
are supposed to be allocated between household members according to some sharing rule, i.e.,
the outcome of an unspeci￿ed decision process. Individual i living in household of type n > 1
receives a share ￿i;n(x;p;z) of total expenditure exp(x). In a second stage, expenditures on all
goods are chosen as if each individual solved her/his own utility maximization problem subject
to an individual budget constraint, i.e., spent her/his own resources ￿i;n ￿ exp(x). The sharing
functions ￿i;n(x;p;z) are di⁄erentiable, comprised between zero and one in such a way that the
shares of all members sum up to unity. In the most general context, they depend on prices and
total expenditure. For instance, we can imagine that the resources accruing to children vary
with the price of child￿ s clothing or toys. They also depend on a vector of household charac-
teristics z, which includes individual characteristics zi and possibly some factors that capture
the relative bargaining positions of the parents, which is potentially important to explain the
level of expenditure devoted to children. To obtain our main identi￿cation results, we adopt the
following assumption:
7Note that individual shares for each child can, in principle, be retrieved by extending the "Russian dolls"
logic of the Rothbarth method. That is, by comparing the budget share of adult expenditure for couples with
N ￿ 1 children to that of couples with N children, ceteris paribus, we can retrieve information about how much
resources have been allocated to the Nth child. This identi￿cation is however more fragile than what we present
here and is kept for future research.
6A.1. The resource shares are di⁄erentiable functions that do not depend on total expenditure
x, that is, ￿i;n(x;p;z) = ￿i;n(p;z) for i = m, w or c and n = 2;3.
While this assumption is potentially strong, it is made essentially for the sake of simplicity, as
in Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), Bargain and Donni (2009) and Dunbar et al. (2010). In fact,
it can be shown that identi￿cation results still hold if expenditures on several adult goods are
observable (see Bargain and Donni, 2009). Also, A.1 can be mitigated in empirical applications
by including measures of household wealth other than total expenditure in resource shares. In
addition, notice that this assumption implies that the indi⁄erence/equivalence scales derived
from the model are independent of the base, a property most often imposed in the traditional
literature on equivalence scales.
Scaling Functions si;n(x;p;z). The publicness of goods, and hence economies of scale in
the household, is represented by a particular technology of production. Following Lewbel and
Pendakur (2008), we assume that the "value" of total expenditure is in￿ ated by the presence
of several persons in the household (e.g., a couple always riding the car together "consumes"
actual car expenditures twice). The de￿ ator si;n < 1 is interpreted as a measure of the cost
savings experienced by person i as a result of scale economies in the household. For the purpose
of identi￿cation, we introduce the following assumption:
A.2. The economies of scales are di⁄erentiable functions that do not depend on total expen-
diture x, that is, si;n(x;p;z) = si;n(p;z) for i = m, w or c and n = 2;3.
This is the so-called ￿ independent of the base￿(IB) assumption which refers to the fact that the
economies of scale are assumed to be independent of the base expenditure (and hence utility) level
at which they are evaluated. This assumption is similar to the IB restriction in the equivalence
scale literature (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1993; Lewbel, 1991), but it concerns individual utility
functions rather than aggregated household utility functions. The utility function of a person i
living in a household of type n can thus be written as:
ui;n = vi(p;x + log￿i;n(p;z) ￿ logsi;n(p;z);zi): (2)
The scaling function si;n(p;z) generally depends on all the individual characteristics of the
persons living in the household, z. Indeed, it cannot be excluded that the extent of joint
consumption of one person in the household be related to the characteristics of her/his partner
or her/his child. Moreover, since the degree of publicness in consumption depends on the type
of good, the scaling function must be price-dependent.8 Finally, scaling functions must be
8The idea that some goods are consumed in common (and thereby largely a⁄ected by economies of scale)
while other goods are not can be represented here, admittedly in a quite restrictive way, by the derivative of
7individual-speci￿c, since economies of scale may di⁄er between individuals within the same
household, depending on how they value the good which is jointly consumed.
The ￿ exibility o⁄ered by IB scales is particularly important. The arrival of a child in the house-
hold may indeed change consumption patterns and hence the degree of publicness in consumption
in the household. Close to the notion of public goods, externalities of consumption, either posi-
tive or negative, may also characterize consumptions decisions in families. For instance, parents
may decide to stop smoking and to change their leisure activities after the birth of a child. As
discussed in Browning et al. (2008), scaling factors si;n may embody positive/negative external-
ities within the household or changes in individual preferences across di⁄erent household types.
Admittedly, disentangling the di⁄erent explanations is hard to achieve empirically.9 Importantly,
even with the present IB simpli￿cation, this extended interpretation gives an additional argu-
ment in favor of making scaling factors individual-speci￿c. It also shows that this additional
￿ exibility contributes to mitigate the assumption of preference stability across household types,
as previously discussed.
3.2 Economies of Scale and Indi⁄erence Scales
The present set-up allows us to de￿ne indi⁄erence scales in the sense of Lewbel (2003), Lewbel
and Pendakur (2008) and Browning et al. (2008). Let us denote logIi;n(p;z) = logsi;n(p;z) ￿
log￿i;n(p;z) so that equation (2) can be compactly written as:
ui;n = vi(p;x ￿ logIi;n(p;z);zi): (3)
The term Ii;n(p;z) is the indi⁄erence scale of member i; it represents the income adjustment
applied to this person in a multi-person household that would allow her/him to reach the same
indi⁄erence curve if living alone. This concept di⁄ers from an ordinary equivalence scale, which
attempts to compare the welfare of an individual to that of a household. In contrast, indi⁄erence
scales can be seen as comparing the same individual in two di⁄erent situations: living alone and
living with a partner (with or without children).10 Note that with A.1 and A.2, indi⁄erence
si;n(p;z) with respect to prices. For instance, for goods that have a large public component (like housing), an
increase in their price reduces the purchased quantity and thus has a positive e⁄ect on the scale si;n(p;z) (i.e.,
a negative e⁄ect on economies of scale). In fact, IB scales can be seen as an approximation of Barten scales (see
Lewbel and Pendakur, 2008).
9For instance, assume that married men care more about a cozy home than single men. Whether this is due
to a change in taste, to the fact that they internalize the positive externality on their partner or to the e⁄ect of
consuming "housing costs" jointly is a matter of speculation.
10Directly consistent with individualism, they avoid the di¢ culties related to the ill-de￿ned concept of "house-
hold utility" and do not su⁄er from the fundamental identi￿cation problem associated with interpersonal com-
parisons (see Pollak and Wales, 1979).
8scales are independent of the base, a property which is often imposed in the equivalent scale
literature (see Blackorby and Donaldson, 1993).
Finally, the de￿ ator representing economies of scale si;n(p;z) cannot be interpreted directly.
Indeed it generally ranges between ￿i;n(p;z) (all the consumption is public) and 1 (all the goods
are purely private). As it must be compared to the level of the individual share, we suggest a
normalized indicator of the ￿ individual￿economies of scale for each individual:






for n ￿ 2, which is equal to 1 in the purely private case and to 2 in the purely public case.
3.3 The Budget Shares of Total Expenditure
If the Roy￿ s identity is applied to equation (2), and the derivative is developed, then individual







i (p;x ￿ logIi;n(p;z);zi); (4)
where !k
i;n(p;x;z) is the share of member i￿ s resources exp(x)￿￿i;n(p;z) that are spent on good
k and ￿
k
i;n(p;z) = @ logsi;n(p;z)=@pk is the elasticity of si;n(p;z) with respect to the k-th price.
The consequence of the IB assumption in the present context is that the budget share equations
of person i living in a household of type n di⁄er from when alone in that they are translated
over by ￿
k
i;n(p;z) while log household expenditure x is translated over by logIi;n(p;z). This
property is referred to as "shape invariance" by Pendakur (1999).11 To unify our notation, we
also introduce the following de￿nitions.
N.1. For single households (n = 1), we have: ￿i;1(p;z) = 1, ￿
k
i;n(p;z) = 0, si;n(p;z) = 1 for
i = w or m and k = 1;:::;K.
This condition is also a normalization. It implicitly means that single individuals are used as
the demographic structure of reference. Now, let us suppose that households are observed in
a unique price regime, as provided in cross-sectional data, so that the vector of prices p is
constant and can be taken out of equation (4). Formally, the implications of the IB assumption
in a framework with no price variation are described in the following lemma.
11The translation function ￿
k
i;n(p;z) is speci￿c to good k and related to the di⁄erences that may exist between
goods with respect to the possibility of joint consumption. Intuitively, economies of scale may have a wealth
e⁄ect and a substitution e⁄ect. The former is represented by logsi;n(p;z) and the latter by ￿
k
i;n(p;z). The
substitution e⁄ect is positive (negative) if good k is essentially public (private).
9Lemma 1 (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2008). Assume A.1￿ A.2 and N.1. If prices are constant,







i (x ￿ logIi;n(z);zi); (5)
for i = w;m;c; n = 1;2;3, and k = 1;:::;K:
where logIi;n(z) = logsi;n(z)￿log￿i;n(z) is the log de￿ ator of total expenditure which combines
scaling si;n and sharing ￿i;n.
The left-hand side of expression (5) represents the ￿ reduced-form￿budget share on good k of
person i in household of type n as a function of (log) household resources x and household
characteristics z. The right-hand side puts some structure on this budget share as a result of
the IB restriction: the individual budget share function wk
i (￿;zi) of person i depends on her/his
individual resources adjusted by the scaling si;n(z) and on individual characteristics zi (but
not on the characteristics of the other individuals in the household); this budget share is then
translated by the elasticity ￿
k
i;n(z).
Household expenditures on each good k can be written as the sum of individual expenditures on
that good. Dividing this identity by the total outlay exp(x), we obtain directly the household









for households of any type n, where ’n is the set of the index of persons living in a household of
type n. This is simply the sum of individual budget share equations over all household members,
weighted by their individual resource shares.
3.4 Identi￿cation Results
Our goal here is to identify the important structural elements of the model, namely the sharing
functions and the scaling functions, from demand data. To account for unobserved factors, we







n; for n = 1;2;3 and k = 1;:::;K;
where f W k
n(x;z) is the stochastic extension of W k
n(x;z). Error terms "k
n are traditionally in-
terpreted as optimization/measurement errors or, alternatively, as resulting from unobservable
heterogeneity in the individual budget share equations (hence assuming random utilities), in the
scales or in the resource shares. The equations (??) can be identi￿ed from well-known results
in non-parametric econometrics provided the sample is su¢ ciently large and error terms satisfy
10normalization restrictions (see Matzkin, 2007, for instance). Identi￿cation thus concentrates on
how to retrieve the structural components si;n(z), and ￿i;n(z), for i = w;m or c and n = 1;2;3,
from the knowledge of the deterministic components W k
n(x;z).
The identi￿cation result that follows relies on a certain number of normalization conditions. First
of all, the condition N.1 previously discussed is obviously necessary. Moreover, the terms that
represent economies of scale in the budget share equations of children are actually meaningless
in a world where young children always live within the same family structure. Hence, without
loss of generality, the following condition is also used.
N.2. For households with children (n = 3), we have: ￿
k
c;n(z) = 0, sc;n(z) = 0 for k = 1;:::;K.
The main result is then summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume A.1￿ A.2 and N.1￿ N.2. The econometrician observes at least one adult-
speci￿c good for each adult living in the household. More precisely, one good km is consumed
by men but not by women or children and one other good kw is consumed by women but not by
men or children. The budget share equations for these goods satisfy the following conditions:
1. rxw
ki
i (xi;n;zi) 6= 0 and rxxw
ki
i (xi;n;zi) 6= 0 almost everywhere for i = m or w,
2. the function ￿
ki








is not periodic in its ￿rst
argument for i = m or w.
Then, if prices are constant, the sharing functions ￿i;n(z) and the scaling functions si;n(z), for
i = m, w or c and n = 1;2;3, can be identi￿ed from the estimation of the budget share equations
W ki
n (x;z) on the adult-speci￿c goods.
In other words, identi￿cation will exploit the existence of adult goods (such as male and female
clothing) along the lines of the Rothbarth method. In addition, the budget share equations
must be non linear in total expenditure.12 Note that generic identi￿cation can also be obtained
theoretically when there is only one adult-speci￿c good (for instance, if adult male and female
clothing could not be distinguished in expenditure data), yet it is empirically less robust. Gender-
speci￿c clothing expenditure are often available anyway. The proof of Proposition 1 follows in
three steps.
12Recall that a periodic function is a function f(x) such that f(x) = f(x + t) for some scalar t. This is a very
particular property that most functions do not satisfy. In particular, a monotonic function is not periodic.
11Step 1: n = 1. The "basic" budget share equations are simply retrieved by using information
on singles. That is, for n = 1 and using normalization N.1, we simply have:
W
k
1 (x;z) = w
k
i (x;zi);
for any k, with i = m or w, so that identi￿cation of the functions wk
i (￿) can be obtained from a
sample of single male and female individuals.
Step 2: n = 2. The household budget share equations for adult good ki can be written as:
W
ki






i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi)
￿
; (7)
for i = m or w (this good is speci￿c to only one person in the household). To eliminate the
function ￿
ki
i;2(z) from equation (7), we compute the ￿rst-order derivative of this expression with
respect to x and obtain:
rxW
ki
2 (x;z) = ￿i;2(z)rxw
ki
i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi); (8)
where the left-hand side of this expression is identi￿ed. Di⁄erentiating again this expression
with respect to x we obtain the second-order derivative:
rxxW
ki
2 (x;z) = ￿i;2(z)rxxw
k
i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi): (9)










i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi)
rxxw
ki
i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi)
￿ ￿
ki
i (x + logIi;2(z);z)
where the left-hand side of the ￿rst equality and the function ￿
ki
i (￿;z) are known from step
1. This condition uniquely identi￿es the indi⁄erence scales Ii;2(z) for i = m or w, provided the
function ￿
ki
i (￿) is not periodic in its ￿rst argument. Indeed, let us suppose z = ￿ z is constant and
can be eliminated from the arguments of the functions. Then let us consider another solution
I0
i;2 for the equation above so that:
￿
ki











i (￿) is not periodic, this equality is not possible for any value of x. Therefore, the
solution Ii;2 must be unique. Then, for i = m or w, identi￿cation of sharing functions ￿i;2(z)
follows from (8) and identi￿cation of translation functions ￿
ki
i;2(z) from (7). Finally, the scaling
functions si;2(z) can be computed for i = m or w from the de￿nition of Ii;2(z).
12Step 3: n = 3. The household budget share equations for adult goods ki have exactly the
same structure as above:
W
ki






i (x ￿ logIi;3(z);zi)
￿
;
for i = m or w. Hence, identi￿cation of ￿i;3(z), si;3(z) and Ii;3(z) for i = m or w is straightfor-
ward. The share of total expenditure devoted to children is then obtained as:
￿c;3(z) = 1 ￿ ￿m;3(z) ￿ ￿w;3(z);
while the scaling function sc;3(z) is given by normalization N.2.
4 Empirical Implementation
4.1 Functional Forms
We turn to the empirical speci￿cation of the complete model, suggesting a parameterization
that balances ￿ exibility and empirical tractability. The ￿rst component, which appears in the
speci￿cation of the di⁄erent demographic groups, is the "basic" budget share equation. We







i ￿ (xi;n;h ￿ ￿izi;h) + c
k
i ￿ (xi;n;h ￿ ￿izi;h)
2 ; for i = w;m;c and k = 1;:::;K;
where xi;n;h is de￿ned as previously for observation h, bk
i, and ck
i are parameters and ak
izi;h and
￿izi;h are linear functions of the socio-demographic variables zi;h de￿ned below. For adults, the
parameters and functions are gender-speci￿c (with i = m for men, i = w for women) but do
not depend on the demographic type n nor on the number of children, since the "basic" adult
budget share equations are the same for single women (resp. men) and for women (resp. men)
living in a couple. The demographic variables enter the speci￿cation both as a translation of
budget share equations and as a translation of log scaled expenditure. For adults, the latter
characteristics, those entering ￿izi;h, include age and a dummy for "no education". The former,
those entering ak
izi;h, include the same variables plus a constant, dummies for house ownership
and urban resident. For children, the characteristics entering ak
izi;h include a constant, the
average age of the children and the proportion of male children in the household.
Next, we specify the household budget share equations. For single male and female adults, they






i (xh;zi;h) + "
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comprise the individual functions wk
i (￿;zi;h) as already speci￿ed and three other components





j2’n;h exp(￿j;n + ￿jzh)
, for i = m;w;c,
where ￿i;n are parameters and ￿izh are linear functions of the household characteristics. To limit
the number of parameters, variables in ￿izh include spouses￿age, the "no education" dummy
of each spouse and a urban dummy. Normalization is obviously required and we simply set the
coe¢ cients of the exponential corresponding to the wife to zero. For the share of children, we
include the proportion of male children and the average age of the children in the household. As
indicated above, and because we want the share of children to vary with the presence of children
in a ￿ exible way, we introduce dummies for households with two and three children. Second, the
log scaling functions that translate expenditure within the basic budget shares can be written
as:
logsi;n(zh) = Ai;n + Bizh, for i = m;w
where Ai;n are parameters and Bizh linear functions of the characteristics. The scaling functions
can in principle vary with all the variables entering preferences. In our speci￿cation, however,
it is restricted to depend only on variables speci￿c to individual i for adults (education and
age). To limit the number of parameters, only the constant is indexed by the type of family n.
Third, the function that translates the basic budget shares ￿
k
i;n(z) is a price elasticity. Measuring
price e⁄ects is generally challenging ￿and it is all the more di¢ cult to capture their interaction
with demographics in any plausible way. Therefore we restrict these terms to be constant (and





i;n; for i = m or w, n = 2;3; and k = 1;:::;K:
4.2 Estimation Method
The complete model is estimated by the iterated SURE method. To account for the likely
correlation between the error terms "k
n;h in each budget share function and the log total expendi-
ture, each budget share equation is augmented with the ￿ Wu-Hausman￿residuals (Banks et al.,
141997; Blundell and Robin, 1999). To allow for su¢ cient ￿ exibility of the covariance matrices,
we shall now consider six demographic groups (instead of three in what precedes) indexed by
ne = 1;:::;6 (for single males, single females, childless couples, couples with one to three chil-
dren respectively). Hence, for each group separately, the residual is obtained from reduced-form
estimations of x on all exogenous variables used in the model plus some excluded instruments.
For the latter, we choose the inverse of household disposable income and a fourth order polyno-
mials in its logarithm. Since budget shares sum up to one, equation for good K is unnecessary.
The household budget share equations for the K ￿ 1 goods and for the six demographic groups
are estimated simultaneously. The error terms are supposed to be uncorrelated across house-
holds but correlated across goods within households. They are supposed to be homoskedastic for
each family type n. Observations in the data are indexed by h and the number of observation
in each demographic group is denoted by Hne; with ne = 1;:::;6. Let Wne;h be the (K ￿ 1)
vector of observed budget shares for the ￿rst K ￿ 1 goods consumed by household h of type
ne and let ^ Wne;h(￿) be the corresponding (K ￿ 1) vector of predicted budget shares for some
parameter vector ￿. The vector of residuals is thus given by "ne;h(￿) = Wne;h ￿ ^ Wne;h(￿). If
^ "ne;h = "ne;h(^ ￿0), where ^ ￿0 is any initial consistent estimation of the vector of parameters, the
estimated covariance matrix can be de￿ned by
^ Vne = H
￿1
ne ￿ (^ "ne;h)(^ "ne;h)
0 :









which gives a new value ^ ￿1 for the estimates. The estimation procedure is then iterated with
the new estimates until the covariance matrix converges.
4.3 Data and Sample Selection
The availability and quality of data from C￿te d￿ Ivoire has attracted a large number of empirical
studies (Deaton, 1989, 1997; Du￿ o and Udry, 2004; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1991, 1995, among
others). In our empirical analysis, we make use of the most recent available survey for this
country, namely the C￿te d￿ Ivoire 2002 Living Standard Survey (CILSS, EnquŒte Niveau de
Vie des MØnages) conducted by the Institut National de la Statistique between January and
December 2002. This is a cross sectional national survey which collects information on household
expenditure, incomes and socio-demographics with an initial sample of 10;800 households. While
price in￿ ation has been high during the second half of the 2000s, it was relatively small in 2002
(2:5%) so that the sample can be treated as cross-sectional data.
15We restrict the sample to monogamous, nuclear households (i.e., either a single adult or a married
couple with or without children). This selection drops 50% of the initial sample. We further
restrict our sample to households where adults are aged between 18 ￿ 64 years, which excludes
another 4% of the sample. We drop households with children whose age is above 16 years, to
ensure that we can distinguish children￿ s clothing from adults clothing, as these are the central
goods used in the identi￿cation of our model. We also drop households with more than three
children since they are primarily composed of older children. By this selection we drop 10% of
the initial sample. We ￿nally exclude single women living with children (5%), households where
men are not economically active (2%) and households with zero food expenditure together with
obvious outlying observations (2%). This selection leaves us with 2;920 households (27% of the
initial sample), described in Table 1.
Formally, a pair of adult-speci￿c goods (i.e., male and female clothing) and a residual good are
just what we need to identify children￿ s resource shares, as explained in the previous section.
However, we consider other non-durable goods to improve the e¢ ciency of the estimations: food,
transport and communication, personal goods and services, leisure goods and services, household
operations and housing costs (composed of maintenance costs, rental costs and imputed housing
costs for house owners).13 We also include a child-speci￿c good (i.e., child clothing). Thus, our
estimation use observations for K = 9 non-durable commodities, housing being the omitted good
in the Engel curve system. This system comprises 6 non-exclusive good, with three individual
budget shares (two for the adults and one for children), and 3 assignable goods (adult male,
adult female and child clothing); hence a total of 21 individual Engel curves.
Budget information is collected via a questionnaire where respondents are asked to report ex-
penditures on various goods. Food expenditures are recorded with a recall period of last seven
days and last month while clothing expenditure which is central to our analysis has a recall
period of last 12 months. This helps to avoid too many zeros due to infrequency of purchase for
the key goods in our analysis. The lower part of Table 1 reports reassuringly high proportions
of strictly positive values for adult and child clothing.
13Traditionally, expenditures on housing are not modeled. Nonetheless, we believe that expenditure on housing
cannot be ignored in our analysis as they may be an important contributor to household economies of scale and
are also important when addressing poverty issues (as we do). Note, however, that the size of the household may
be correlated with housing decisions.













Age (male) * 33.4 _ 35.1 33.8 36.7 38.6
(10.0) (9.8) (8.3) (8.9) (8.2)
Age (female) _ 38.2 27.2 25.5 28.0 30.1
(13.1) (9.0) (6.9) (7.3) (7.1)
No schooling (male) 0.49 _ 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.58
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
No schooling (female) _ 0.54 0.64 0.70 0.73 0.77
(0.00) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.44) (0.42)
House owner 0.23 0.28 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.54
(0.42) (0.45) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Rural 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.62 0.65
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
14.3 15.3 20.3 20.9 21.0 21.5
(10.2) (11.3) (12.9) (14.1) (15.2) (17.1)
37.5 41.2 54.6 56.6 60.0 66.2
(28.9) (25.) (34.3) (35.3) (41.5) (53.1)
Average age of children _ _ _ 3.4 5.0 5.9
(3.5) (3.2) (2.7)
Prop.  of male children _ _ _ 0.49 0.51 0.52
(0.50) (0.36) (0.30)
Budget shares:
Food 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.54
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Personal goods and services 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Leisure goods and services 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Household operations 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Housing 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Transport and communication 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Budget shares (exclusive goods)
Women's clothing _ 0.042 0.043 0.037 0.036 0.036
(0.041) (0.037) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Men's clothing 0.040 _ 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.019
(0.043) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
Children's clothing _ _ _ 0.020 0.026 0.032
(0.020) (0.026) (0.024)
Total clothing 0.040 0.042 0.066 0.079 0.082 0.086
Proportion of positive values:
Women's clothing _ 0.73 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.89
Men's clothing 0.83 _ 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.80
Children's clothing _ _ _ 0.92 0.94 0.95
Sample size 969 223 335 526 514 353
Notes: standard errors in brackets
** Household expenditures for goods selected in the 9-good demand system
*** Total household expenditures
* Men in Sub-Saharan Africa typically marry younger women (median difference is 7 years according to: United Nations (2001),
World marriage patterns; New york, Populaton division, department of economic and social affairs.
Household expenditure ($/week) **
Household expenditure ($/week) ***
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5.1 A First Look at the Data
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample by household type and the number of chil-
dren. We observe that around half of adult men and up to three-quarter of adult women have no
education, which justi￿es the choice of a simple dummy ("no education") in the aforementioned
speci￿cation of the empirical model. Other characteristics are in line with common wisdom
about a developing country like C￿te d￿ Ivoire. In particular, budget shares show that food is the
main item, representing around half of household expenditure, which is a similar proportion as
in previous surveys using CILSS data (Haddad et al., 1994, Hoddinott and Haddad, 1994, Du￿ o
and Udry, 2004, Udry and Woo, 2006). Importantly for our purpose is the shift in consumption
patterns of adult-speci￿c goods as household composition changes. We ￿nd that the presence
of children in the household reduces the budget shares devoted to parents￿clothing. While
couples without children allocate 4:3% and 2:3% of their budget to women and men￿ s clothing
respectively, this drops to 3:7% and 2:2% (3:6% and 2:0%) respectively in couples with one child
(two children). Expenditures in absolute terms also decrease.14 The pattern uncovered here is
in line with the widely accepted notion that children impose economic costs on their parents.
According to the Rothbarth intuition, the arrival of a child is similar to an income e⁄ect which
decreases the welfare parents get out of consumption as they re-allocate their limited resources
to accommodate children￿ s needs. At the same time, Table 1 shows that the budget share of
the typically private goods (i.e., food, total clothing, and to a lesser extent, leisure expenditure)
increases with the size of the household while the budget share of typically public goods (i.e.,
housing, and to a less extent, transport) decreases.15 A simple interpretation is that economies
of scale are substantial, and not the same for all goods.16 That is, economies of scale generate
14For instance, while the average yearly expenditure on male (female) clothing, expressed in PPP dollars, is
23:1 (41:3) in childless couples, it drops to 22:1 and 19:3 (35:1 and 32:8) in couples with one and two children
respectively.
15This is also true when controlling for total outlay.
16Economies of scale in food consumption may exist too. This is particularly the case for households with
two or more adults relative to single adults living alone (Deaton and Paxson, 1998, Vernon, 2005, Browning et
al., 2006). This is con￿rmed here with a slight decrease of food share in childless couples compared to singles.
When children enter the picture, the "privateness" of food and the fact that children are more food intensive
than parents prevail and lead to the observed increase in food share. The fact that children￿ s food consumption
is disproportionately higher makes that the cost of children is usually overestimated when calculated on the
basis of variations in food expenditure across household types, i.e., the Engel approach (see Deaton, 1997). The
Rothbarth approach based on adult goods avoids this critique.
18an e⁄ect that incites consumption of private goods (substituting away from public goods).17
Among the preliminary inspections of the data, we have also checked for endogeneity of total
expenditure and for the non-linearity of budget share equations in log expenditure (especially
for adult goods, as explained above). To do so, we have performed reduced-form estimations
on the subsample of each household type ne. Estimates are available from the authors and
we simply summarize the main results here. The budget shares for male and female clothing
are regressed on age, the dummies for education, house ownership and urban residency, as well
as the log total expenditure, its square and the Wu-Hausman residual. The coe¢ cients of log
expenditure and its square show a quadratic pattern in most subsamples, implying that on
average clothing is a luxury good (see also Banks et al., 1997, Bargain and Donni, 2009 for a
similar result). Coe¢ cients are signi￿cant in most cases. The coe¢ cient of the Wu-Hausman
residual is negative and signi￿cant in all subsamples, except for single females and for male
clothing in childless couples. This suggests that endogeneity of expenditure is an issue so that
this residual must also be included in the structural Engel curve estimations.
In what follows, we report and discuss the main estimates of our structural model based on
K ￿ 1 = 8 household Engel curves. Our general speci￿cation contains 202 parameters (out of
which 98 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at least at the 10% level). While the complete
estimates are available from the authors, we focus on scaling factors, interpreted as economies
of scale, and on resources shares for adults and children.
5.2 Economies of Scale
The estimates of the scaling factors si;n(z) are shown in the left panel of Table 2. We ￿rst
recall that the terms representing scale economies for children are normalized to 1. If the scales
for adults are to be interpreted as re￿ ecting joint consumption, they should in principle lie
between ￿i;n(z) (complete jointness of consumption) and 1 (purely private consumption) for a
childless couple. In this respect, the estimates are reasonable in magnitude, especially given
that we have not restricted the size of the coe¢ cients in any way. The fact that these scales
are much lower than 1 also underlines the possible existence of sizeable economies of scale in
the household, which invalidates the traditional Rothbarth approach. For instance, a scale of
0:597 for a woman with a child suggests that her cost of living is 59:7% of the cost she would
experience if living alone. We nonetheless remain cautious with this reading, given the broader
interpretation of these scales suggested in section 2. Moreover, the magnitudes of the de￿ ators
17Instead of total expenditure for couples without children to increase by a factor of 2 (when using the average
expenditures of single men and women), it increases by a factor of 1:4, implying 33% savings derived from sharing.
This result is also consistent with Lazear and Michael (1980) who ￿nd that expenditures of two adults living
together are 30 ￿ 35% lower than combined expenditure for two single-adult households (US data).
19Table 2: Estimated economies of scale
no children 1  child 2 children 3 children no children 1  child 2 children 3 children
women 0.457 0.597 0.510 0.449 1.794 1.372 1.514 1.607
(0.591) (0.805) (0.701) (0.707) (1.894) (1.251) (1.455) (1.760)
men 0.827 0.881 0.820 0.687 1.312 1.153 1.240 1.447
(0.405) (0.429) (0.415) (0.384) (0.887) (0.626) (0.674) (0.800)
Scaling factors Normalized scaling factors
Baseline model estimated on 9 goods (one residual: housing costs). Scaling factors are calculated for representative
household, but estimates change very little with education or being urban/rural.
for di⁄erent household types cannot be compared directly, since household members consume
only a fraction of total expenditure. Hence, the right panel reports the normalized scaling factors
￿i;n(z), as previously de￿ned. They amount to 1:31 (resp. 1:79) for a man (resp. woman) living
in a couple without children (recall that in the limit case, ￿i;n(z) = 2, all the goods purchased
by spouses can be considered as public consumption).18 One may expect economies of scale to
increase in families with children compared to childless couples. Yet this may not always be
the case if children bias consumption patterns towards more "privateness".19 The total e⁄ect is
undetermined and remains an empirical question. Point estimates show a sharp decrease in scale
economies with the ￿rst child, suggesting that there is less sharing of goods consumed by adults
in this household type. They increase regularly with additional children, indicating economies of
scale in larger families. Women seem to gain more than men from joint consumption. However,
estimates are very imprecise and di⁄erences between household types are not signi￿cant.
5.3 Resource Shares and Poverty
We compute resource shares ￿i;n(z) for all the individuals in our sample and report statistics for
di⁄erent sub-groups. Table 3 summarizes the results while Table A.1 in the Appendix reports
the mean shares for men, women and children in detailed demographic groups and according
to parents￿education levels. Note that estimations of resource shares are in general much more
precise than that of scaling factors. Results indicate slightly larger share for men on average.
18Joint consumption among households is certainly important. On Canadian data, Browning et al. (2008)
obtain economies of scale, aggregated over the household using a di⁄erent methodology, which are in the same
order of magnitude (i.e., between 1:27 and 1:41). On US data, Nelson (1989) ￿nds even larger economies of scale.
19For goods with a high public component, like housing, economies of scale may partly disappear as the family
decides to move to a bigger house to accommodate an additional child. For private goods, we have discussed
above the fact that food shares increase with the presence of children (who are more food intensive than adults),
which may overall result in an increase in the relative level of private consumption in the household.
20We observe a more balanced division of resources when women are educated and men are not
(Table A.1). The di⁄erence between spouses is however not statistically signi￿cant.20 To our
knowledge, existing evidence based on the estimation of collective models is limited to developed
countries. For instance, the average wife￿ s shares, as estimated by Browning et al. (2008) on
Canadian data and by Bargain and Donni (2009) on French data, are in excess of 0:60. An
exception is Dunbar et al. (2010) who ￿nd larger shares for men in couples with several children
in Malawi ￿they also ￿nd that the absolute share of husbands increases in families of several
children compared to one-child families, in the spirit of Du￿ o (2003).
The resource share of children seems reasonable and increases in a plausible way with household
size (recall that we have not imposed any regularity in the sharing function in that respect).
The per capita shares become smaller with the number of children, as in Dunbar et al. (2010).
Mean shares are around 12:6% (￿rst child), 8:3% (second child) and 6:8% (third child). Table
A.1 indicates that boys receive more than girls, yet the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant. Hence, our
results are in line with Deaton (1989) who found no evidence of child gender bias in the overall
treatment of boys and girls in C￿te d￿ Ivoire, using adult equivalence outlay ratios and data for
the year 1985. Deaton (1997) suggests that the absence of child gender bias may be due to the
fact that women in West Africa are economically productive and girls are not seen as a burden
in their parents, while Haddad et al. (1994) explains this from a cultural perspective.21 Point
estimates show that children receive higher shares when the mother is the educated adult, yet
this trend is not statistically signi￿cant.
Estimated shares give us a sense of who get how much in the household. Yet it does not tell
us if resource allocations are premised on the corresponding needs of each individual or re￿ ect
inequality in terms of welfare. Hence, we take a step further and examine the implications of these
allocations on the poverty of the di⁄erent household members. To this end, we use the computed
resource shares accruing to each individual in the household to construct the actual expenditure
for a given individual. We use the World Bank￿ s poverty line set at US$2 per day to identify poor
adults. As in Dunbar et al. (2010), we use a US$1:20 per day poverty line for children, which
means that children￿ s needs are 60% that of adults (as in the modi￿ed OECD equivalence scale).
The poverty levels arising therefrom are labeled "unequal" in Table 3 while poverty based on
per capita expenditure, i.e., a standard measure ignoring intra-household inequality, is reported
under the "equal" label. Overall we ￿nd that poverty increases with household size when using
20Further research should incorporate distribution factors like di⁄erences between spouses in terms of exogenous
income, which may in￿ uence the overall structure of consumption and female and child shares. For instance,
Thomas (1990) note that unearned income in the hands of the mother has a bigger e⁄ect on child health.
21They suggest that parents are reluctant to discriminate against daughters due to the practice of bride-wealth
in which parents of a bride receive payment as a compensation for the loss of a valuable worker.
21the usual per capita measure, from 21:8% of childless households to 50:4% of households with
three children (for a comparison, the World Bank reported a general poverty rate of 42% in
2002). When using the "unequal" measure, however, adult poverty rates are smaller and do not
change much across household types, which re￿ ects the fact that their resource shares do not
decrease proportionally with the number of people in the household. In contrast, resources in
larger households are skewed in favor of adults rather than children. As indicated above, per
capita expenditure for children decreases with the number of children. As the per capita measure
over-estimates poverty levels for adults, it also severely under-estimates poverty among children.
Dunbar et al. (2010) point to very similar results in Malawi. Admittedly, poverty levels depend
on the assumption concerning the relative needs of each household member. We have used the
modi￿ed OECD scale for an illustration, yet child poverty remains greatly understated unless
one is ready to assume very small needs for children.22 In fact, for child poverty to equalize adult
poverty, children￿ s need should be as little as 30%, 25% and 17% of adult needs in couples with
one, two and three children respectively. If these levels are deemed implausible, this indicates a
certain extent of intrahousehold inequality.
Finally, the poverty rates of single women (men) is around 10% (15%), i.e., much smaller than
that of adults living with ohers. When joint consumption is accounted for, however, poverty
rates of adults in couples go down very substantially. This can be seen in the last column of Table
3, which reports an "unequal, adjusted" measure of poverty for adults, i.e., based on individual
shares and accounting for the gains due to joint consumption. For instance, in couples with two
children, individual poverty rates are 29:2% (24:5%) for women (men) according to the "unequal"
measure. They decline to 9:5% (15:8%) after accounting for economies of scale. In all cases,
the reduction in poverty levels is higher for women, which re￿ ects previous di⁄erences in scale
economies between men and women. This pattern is consistent across all types of households and
shows (with the reservation that standard errors of scaling factors are large) that for all types,
poverty rates of adults living in a family are of the same order as that of single individuals. That
is, for adults, joint consumption tends to compensate the fact that people must share resources.
6 Additional Results
6.1 Comparison with Dunbar et al. (2010)￿ s study
At this stage, it may be interesting to make a comparison with the method suggested by Dunbar
et al. (2010), already mentioned in the introduction. Both studies rely to some extent on
22If we assume that children needs are only 30% that of adults, their poverty rates go down to 25%, 40% and
59% in couples with one, two and three children respectively.
22Table 3: Poverty rates
mean std. dev. min. med. max. Equal Unequal
Unequal,
adjusted
Couple with no child woman 0.478 0.051 0.386 0.487 0.586 0.218 0.224 0.051
man 0.522 0.051 0.414 0.513 0.614 0.218 0.122
Couple with one child woman 0.411 0.038 0.342 0.422 0.490 0.329 0.281 0.146
man 0.463 0.050 0.367 0.447 0.553 0.245 0.179
 children 0.126 0.013 0.100 0.126 0.161 0.715
each child 0.126 0.013 0.100 0.126 0.161
Couples with two children woman 0.402 0.036 0.331 0.414 0.470 0.442 0.292 0.095
man 0.432 0.053 0.315 0.420 0.533 0.247 0.158
two children 0.165 0.020 0.129 0.165 0.228 0.877
each child 0.083 0.010 0.065 0.083 0.114
Couples with three children woman 0.387 0.032 0.321 0.398 0.442 0.504 0.263 0.085
man 0.408 0.049 0.325 0.392 0.508 0.224 0.108
three children 0.205 0.017 0.171 0.210 0.235 0.909
each child 0.068 0.006 0.057 0.070 0.078
Resource shares Poverty rates
Note: shares are calculated for each individual and we report statistics for each demographic group. For poverty rates, we use the $2 per day poverty line
for an adult, as suggested by the World Bank, and US$ 1.20 per day for a child. "Equal" poverty rates are obtained using per capita expenditure. "Unequal"
poverty rates are obtained using the share of expenditure that each individual receives in the household. "Unequal, adjusted" accounts for the scale
economies in couples. For the latter, note that for a comparison, the poverty rate of single men (women) is 14.9% (10.0%).
the stability of individual preferences across household types and on adult clothing to identify
children￿ s share. The identi￿cation result of Dunbar et al. (2010) also exploits child goods, which
is not necessary in our case, even if it may improve the precision of the results. Another di⁄erence
is the fact that we are using information on single individuals while their approach simply relies on
couples. Our approach is, in a sense, more restrictive since we assume preference stability across
more household types and, notably, between individuals alone and in a family. Nevertheless,
Dunbar et al. (2010) are incited to make assumptions on the stability of preferences across
people living in the household to obtain precise results, and some of their identi￿cation relies on
parametric forms. Finally, our approach allows recovering economies of scale and indi⁄erence
curves. The latter are required to compare the living standard of singles and persons in couple
(with children or not). Unsurprisingly, our approach uses more structure so that it is possible
to recover more elements of the decision process.
The principal objective of both studies is to retrieve resource shares for the most vulnerable
family members, i.e., children. Hence, it is important to check that the two approaches do not
lead to completely di⁄erent results in this respect. Comparison is made in the ￿rst columns of
23Table 4. Even though the empirical approaches and the countries are di⁄erent, the children￿ s
shares are relatively close. For couples with one, two and three children, shares per child are
13:5 (12:6), 10:5 (8:3) and 7:9 (6:8) in their (our) case. Inequality between spouses is also similar
for childless couples ￿but contrasted for larger families. That is, we ￿nd that both parents
contribute to children expenditure while results for Malawi show that the cost of children is
essentially born by mothers (fathers￿share even increase with family size). The similarity of
results concerning children￿ s shares is not surprising ￿and surely reassuring ￿given that the
two studies use the same fundamental principle to recover them, i.e., the Rothbarth idea of
measuring how the consumption of adult goods vary across di⁄erent household types.
6.2 Other Models
We ￿nally suggest alternative empirical strategies, relying on the same fundamental identifying
principle. The objective is to extend the comparison with Dunbar et al. (2010) and to consolidate
the general method based on adult clothing. We check especially if the measure of children￿ s
share is not too sensitive to the other assumptions made on top of the Rothbarth￿ s principle
(and in particular the way ￿ exibility is introduced in the Rothbarth model).
Model without Information on Singles. We start with a model which is closer to that
of Dunbar et al. (2010) in the sense that we now restrict our estimations to observations on
couples only, using expenditure on adult clothing, child clothing and a residual (corresponding
to other household expenditures). The parents are treated as a unitary couple, so that we focus
only on sharing between parents and children.23 Childless couples now serve as the reference
group (couples with one child in the case of Dunbar et al., 2010). That is, for this group n = 2,
we suppose that there exists a well-behaved indirect utility function va(x;p;za), where index a
stands for ￿ adults￿ . Since the notion of assignability is rather meaningless in the present context,
we now model the budget shares for both adults￿together (e.g., total adult clothing). Denote
ka the adult-speci￿c goods, the household budget share for that good in a childless couple is:
W
ka
2 (x;z) = w
ka
a (x;za); (12)
so the basic budget shares of parents are identi￿ed on childless couples (and not on singles, as












x + log￿a;3(z) ￿ logsa;3(z);za
￿￿
: (13)
23This is more parsimonious than in the other approaches, but not really costly in terms of realism. In-
deed, in the absence of prices and distribution factors in the sharing rule, unitary models cannot be empirically
distinguished from collective ones.
24Table 4: Resource Shares: Estimates from Alternative Models
Model specification



















Couple with one child
adults 0.874 0.044 0.355 0.521 0.865 0.079 0.207 0.675 0.841 0.044 0.735 0.938 0.886 0.063 0.341 0.561
woman 0.411 0.038 0.342 0.490 0.402 0.071 0.168 0.587 0.420 0.022 0.367 0.422 0.365 0.054 0.276 0.470
man 0.463 0.050 0.367 0.553 0.463 0.087 0.245 0.762 0.420 0.022 0.367 0.469 0.522 0.071 0.406 0.652
 children 0.126 0.013 0.100 0.161 0.135 0.047 0.008 0.260 0.159 0.044 0.062 0.265 0.113 0.022 0.061 0.165
each child 0.126 0.013 0.100 0.161 0.135 0.047 0.008 0.260 0.159 0.044 0.062 0.265 0.113 0.022 0.061 0.165
Couple with two children
adults 0.835 0.045 0.323 0.501 0.789 0.071 0.179 0.631 0.830 0.043 0.735 0.905 0.859 0.062 0.319 0.545
woman 0.402 0.036 0.331 0.470 0.273 0.063 0.075 0.475 0.415 0.021 0.368 0.452 0.363 0.052 0.259 0.458
man 0.432 0.053 0.315 0.533 0.516 0.078 0.282 0.786 0.415 0.021 0.368 0.452 0.496 0.072 0.380 0.633
two children 0.165 0.020 0.129 0.228 0.211 0.044 0.059 0.326 0.170 0.043 0.095 0.265 0.140 0.021 0.096 0.182
each child 0.083 0.010 0.065 0.114 0.105 0.022 0.029 0.163 0.085 0.021 0.048 0.132 0.070 0.010 0.048 0.091
Couple with three children
adults 0.795 0.040 0.323 0.475 0.765 0.073 0.111 0.654 0.811 0.035 0.737 0.877 0.837 0.059 0.321 0.521
woman 0.387 0.032 0.321 0.442 0.244 0.065 0.002 0.512 0.405 0.018 0.368 0.438 0.357 0.047 0.265 0.434
man 0.408 0.049 0.325 0.508 0.521 0.081 0.219 0.795 0.405 0.018 0.368 0.438 0.480 0.070 0.377 0.609
three children 0.205 0.017 0.171 0.235 0.236 0.042 0.112 0.374 0.189 0.035 0.123 0.263 0.162 0.024 0.103 0.205
each child 0.068 0.006 0.070 0.078 0.079 0.014 0.037 0.125 0.063 0.012 0.041 0.088 0.054 0.008 0.034 0.068
* in addition, models (I) and (II) assume independence of the base and all models assume that sharing rule functions do not depend on total expenditure.
** S: single males and females, CX: couples X children. In bold, we indicate the reference household type.
Model (II): estimates from Dunbar et al. (2010) using Malawi data, Table 4, page 30
Baseline model Dunbar et al. (2010)




















The identi￿cation is basically the same as in Proposition 1, except that parents￿basic share are
now recovered from childless couples.
Traditional Rothbarth Model. As in the previous model, we suppose that the chosen ref-
erence demographic group is childless couples. Then we ignore scale economies, i.e., assume
￿
ka
a;3 = logsa;3 = 0. The household budget share for the adult good ka is:
W
ka









This model is essentially the traditional Rothbarth approach using childless couples to retrieve
parents￿basic budget shares. Alternatively, it would be possible to use singles for that purpose,
25as in our baseline model or in Gronau (1991). We stick to the chosen speci￿cation so that the
Rothbarth model is nested in the "unitary" parent model.
Results. These two models, estimated on data for couples only, show interesting results, as
reported in the last columns of Table 4. The ￿rst model with "unitary" parents yields larger
shares for the ￿rst child compared to our baseline model (and similar results for other groups).
This may be related to the fact that these variants only rely on Engel curves for clothing
expenditures, or on the fact that childless couples are now use as reference group for normalizing
scale economies.24 With the version of the Rothbarth￿ s model suggested here, children￿ s shares
are smaller for all household types. This can be interpreted as parents having larger shares
because they are not implicitly compensated by scale economies as in other models (see the
similar result on French data, and the related discussion, in Bargain and Donni, 2009). Overall,
the estimations of children￿ s shares are of the same order of magnitude.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest an estimation of the share of household resources accruing to children in
C￿te d￿ Ivoire. Generalizing the conventional Rothbarth method, the approach is consistent with
the existence of economies of scale and parental bargaining in a structural, multi-person model.
Importantly, this contribution completes the literature on collective models, which usually ignore
children and have been essentially applied on data from developed countries. The model is simply
estimated on the basis of Engel curves for typical aggregated commodities including adult-speci￿c
goods (clothing). Identi￿cation is obtained for three types of people (men, women, and children)
in more than three types of households (single men, single women, couples with zero, one, two
or three children). The presence of adult goods in these household types permits identi￿cation
of children￿ s shares even though children are never observed living alone. Empirical results
for C￿te d￿ Ivoire show that scaling factors, interpreted as economies of scale in multi-person
households, turn out to be very large but imprecisely estimated. Parents￿expenditures made for
children living in the household range between 13% and a ￿fth of total resources for couples with
one to three children respectively. Poverty calculations suggest that ignoring intra-household
distribution of resources leads to a large underestimation of child poverty when using reasonable
di⁄erentiation in individual needs across household members.
24In results that are not reported, we ￿nd that estimations are very close to those of the model without
information on singles when male and female clothing expenditures are used separately. This indicates that using
assignable goods for men and women respectively, and using this information to recover the share of each adult,
has no impact on our measure of children￿ s share.
26Interestingly, our results on the resource share of children are very similar to that obtained
under di⁄erent identifying assumptions, and notably when using only assignable goods and
observations for couples. Imposing restrictions ("unitary" parents, no scale economies) also lead
to similar results. In fact, all these variants rely on the same fundamental identifying strategy,
the Rothbarth idea, and help to consolidate the overall approach once additional ￿ exibility is
incorporated.
Two limitations of the present paper could inspire further research. First, resource shares could
be made dependent of total expenditures given data and models for multiple price regimes.
Alternatively, they could depend on another measure of household wealth. This is important to
retrieve how children￿ s shares vary with household total resources and the consequences on child
poverty. Second, a contribution of the present paper was to introduce more ￿ exibility, in the
form of terms accounting for publicness in consumption, in a Rothbarth approach using singles
as the reference group for adults. However, as extensively discussed in the core of the paper,
scaling factors may also capture consumption externalities or changes in individual preferences




1 boy 1  girl     2 girls 2 boys
1 boy & 1
girl
3 boys 3 girls
2 boys &
1 girl
2 girls & 1
boy
Average 0.4783 0.4081 0.4143 0.4050 0.3990 0.4024 0.3884 0.3857 0.3891 0.3860
(0.051) (0.037) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032)
0.4907 0.4126 0.4270 0.4146 0.4245 0.4190 0.3836 0.3882 0.4021 0.4007
(0.055) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.035) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
0.4753 0.4086 0.4118 0.4041 0.3977 0.4010 0.3979 0.3950 0.3896 0.3865
(0.055) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034)
Average 0.5217 0.4598 0.4652 0.4311 0.4350 0.4316 0.4048 0.4124 0.4046 0.4106
(0.051) (0.037) (0.052) (0.051) (0.055) (0.053) (0.052) (0.043) (0.048) (0.050)
0.5093 0.4543 0.4493 0.4182 0.4015 0.4095 0.4122 0.4079 0.3849 0.3887
(0.055) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.054) (0.051) (0.045) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053)
0.5247 0.4594 0.4683 0.4337 0.4382 0.4348 0.3902 0.3990 0.4044 0.4098
(0.055) (0.052) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.045) (0.041) (0.049) (0.052)
Average 0.1321 0.1206 0.1639 0.1659 0.1660 0.2068 0.2019 0.2063 0.2034
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
0.1331 0.1237 0.1673 0.1739 0.1714 0.2042 0.2039 0.2130 0.2107
(0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
0.1320 0.1199 0.1622 0.1642 0.1642 0.2118 0.2060 0.2060 0.2037
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018)
Baseline model estimated on 9 goods (one residual: housing costs). Resource shares calculated for representative household (sample means), except specific variations based
















Table A.1.: Shares of Total Expenditure in Couple Households
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